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Abstract 
This paper examines the impact of capital structure on firm performance in Nigeria as well as 
test the possibility of non-monotonic relationship between capital structure and firm performance 
based on the prediction of the agency cost theory of capital structure when firm use debt 
financing excessively. The study used dynamic panel model on panel data of 115 listed non-
financial firms in Nigeria. Specifically, the paper employed the two step generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimation method that recognizes the persistence of the dependent variable by 
including its lag value as an explanatory variable in the regression model. The major findings 
indicate statistical significant relationship exist between capital structure and firm performance 
particularly when debt financing is moderately employed. However, the paper found evidence of 
non-monotonic relationship between capital structure and firm performance when firms in 
Nigeria employed excessive debt financing which impinged on the performance of firms. The 
findings support the portability of the agency cost theory in the Nigeria context but with caution 
considering the facts that firms in Nigeria were largely finance through short term debt as against 
long term debt financing that was assumed in the agency cost theoretical proposition. 
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1.0 Introduction 
A vibrant and developed private sector that can serve as engine of growth and development is 
very crucial in any nation (Gwatidzo, 2009). As developing countries strive to build their private 
sector, lack of adequate capital in terms of debt and equity may impede the growth and survival 
of businesses especially in Africa. Due to this constraint, firms strive to ensure they combine 
available different types of debt and equity in an optimal manner that can guarantee the 
maximization of shareholders’ wealth or minimizes the weighted average cost of capital. This 
suggests that capital structure may affect firm value (hence performance). This is a complete 
departure from the Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) proposition that the different combination 
of debt and equity (capital structure) does not affect firm value. Modigliani & Miller (1958) 
posits in their first proposition that the capital structure of the firm is independent of the value of 
firm.  
 
While the irrelevance capital structure theorem of Modigliani & Miller (1958) was accorded 
many criticisms due to its idealistic assumptions of no taxes, no transaction or distress costs, 
perfect market information coupled with the linearly related capital structure refinement (MM, 
1963); the agency cost theoretical model popularized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) assumed 
that firms have optimal capital structure position they strive to achieve. The optimal capital 
structure of the firm in the agency cost theoretical model is the capital structure level that 
minimizes the agency cost and maximizes the value of the firm. This implies that capital 
structure choice of the firm is dynamic. The dynamic nature of capital structure suggests that 
capital structure of firms change across firms and time i.e. each firm in an industry for example 
can change their capital structure over time to ensure the agency cost is minimized and value of 
the firm is maximized. More so, capital structure is considered inherently dynamic rather than 
static. Firms often do not adjust instantaneous when making capital structure choice. There are 
transaction costs and adjustment processes involved when adjusting capital structure towards the 
target level, therefore, empirical analysis of capital structure must be treated as a dynamic 
phenomenon rather than static. 
 
The empirical evidence on capital structure and firm performance particularly in Nigeria is 
scanty (see Onwualah, 1998; Sobodu, 1998; Salawu, 2007; Salawu & Agboola, 2008; Adesola, 
2009; Onaolapo & Kajola 2009; Akintoye, 2009). More so, the few studies do not provide 
analyses of the dynamic relationship between capital structure and firm performance. Most 
previous studies in the literature carried out static analyses of the impact of capital structure on 
firm performance within the trade-off and pecking order theoretical framework. The empirical 
findings of past studies have been mixed and inconclusive. There are two basic strands of 
findings in the empirical literature. Some studies such as Berger et al., (1997), John and Senbet 
(1998), Safieddine and Titman (1999), Harvey et al., (2004), Abor (2005), Zeitun and Tian 
(2007), Majumdar and Sen (2010), Sen and Heng (2011), Salim and Yadav (2012) document 
positive relationship between leverage and firm performance. However, several other studies 
report negative relationship between leverage and firm performance including Armen et 
al.,(2004),Zeitun and Tian (2007),King and Santor (2008), Ebaid (2009),Asimakopoulos et 
al.,(2009), Liew (2010), Majumdar and Sen (2010),Salim and Yadav (2012). Due to these 
empirical irregularities, the current study contributes to the capital structure literature by 
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providing evidence from an emerging market context (Nigeria) by examining the dynamic 
impact of capital structure on firm performance of quoted non-financial firms. 
  
The major contribution of this study stem from the use of dynamic estimator to analyze the 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance within the agency cost theoretical 
model in a low income developing countries characterize with several markets imperfections 
such as information asymmetries, poor creditors and shareholders’ protection and poor contract 
enforcements compared to those in the extant literature. The empirical findings indicate that a 
moderate use of debt financing has a significant positive effect on firm performance, while 
excessive use has a negative significant effect on firm performance. Both empirical findings 
support the prediction of the agency cost theory of capital structure and therefore indicate the 
portability of the agency cost theory in the Nigerian context.   
 
Apart from this introduction, the study is presented in four other sections. Section two reviews 
the literature. Section three presents the data and methodology. Section four presents the results 
and discussion of findings. Section five concludes the study.   
 
2.0  Literature Review 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) seminal paper on the irrelevance of capital structure on firm value 
(hence performance) and its later refinement on the relevance of capital structure (see Modigliani 
& Miller, 1963) laid the foundations for other differing theoretical predictions. The trade-off 
theory relaxed the perfect market assumptions of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and predict that 
capital structure is relevant for firm performance for reasons such as tax deductibility of debt 
interest and agency costs (Fosu,2013). The agency cost theoretical model which is an extension 
of the dynamic trade-off theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggests that there are two kinds 
of conflicts of interest at the firm level. One is the conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers and the other is the conflict between managers and debtholders. They posit that debt 
financing is employed to resolve the conflict of interest between managers and shareholders to 
mitigate managers’ opportunistic behaviour and other agency related problems. This has the 
tendency to reduce the free cash flow that managers can use for perks and perquisites by firm 
since it brings about debt commitment that must be repaid to meet up with debt obligations to 
prevent bankruptcy of firm. Going bankrupt may be very costly for the managers especially 
when they have managerial shareholding in the organisation. To forestall this kind of event, 
managers often strive to ensure they meet up with the debt commitments of the organisation. 
Similarly, the managers would also work to maximize value of the firm through improve 
performance.  
 
On the other hand, is the conflict between the shareholders and debt holders (see Harris & Raviv, 
1991; Manos, 2001). The conflict that arises between these parties is usually due to risk of 
default (Margaritis and Psillaki, 2010). The risk of default often leads to an underinvestment 
(Myers, 1977). Stulz (1990) posits that debt financing by the firm compounds the 
underinvestment problem of the firm. The conflict between the debt holders and equity investor 
due to underinvestment is regarded as a cost of using debt rather than benefit therefore agency 
cost theory hypothesizes negative relationship between capital structure and firm performance. 
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Generally, the agency cost theory posits monotonic relationship between leverage and firm 
performance.  
 
The irrelevance of capital structure to firm performance theoretical proposition was first tested 
empirically in the pioneering and seminal article by Modigliani & Miller (1958) refer later as 
(M&M). They tested the relationship between capital structure and firm value under the perfect 
market assumptions in the United States Petroleum, oil and electricity industries using the two –
stage instrumental variable approach. They found value of firms not to be influence by their 
capital structure. Five years later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) corrected their previous 
assumption of no taxes under the perfect market classical assumption by incorporating corporate 
income taxes into their model, because of the tax deductibility of interest payment at the 
corporate level, capital structure was found to have an increasing effect on the value of firm. 
They noted that this is because interest payments were deducted in arriving at the profit figure on 
which taxes is charge. They argued that these payments reduce the corporate tax liability. This 
corporate tax model asserted that the value of firm will be at the maximum with 100 percent use 
of leverage financing. Neither of these predictions reflects objective reality of the world (Ismail, 
2006). Rarely would firms use 100 percent debt in their capital structure. 
 
Fourteen years later, Miller (1977) presented another model that incorporated personal income 
taxes to the existing corporate tax model. Their study asserted that the corporate tax benefit of 
debt may be offset by the tax disadvantage of interest payments at the personal level. Miller 
(1977) hypothesized that if personal tax rates on interest income are relatively higher than the 
personal tax rates on equity, then the gains to corporate leverage can largely be discounted or 
even eliminated entirely, thus reverting to the irrelevant results of capital structure earlier 
reported in the MM(1958) study. Since this position has been held by Modigliani and Miller, 
several empirical studies have been conducted in the capital structure literature both in the 
developed and developing economies to test the validity of the proposition of relevant or 
irrelevance of capital structure to firm performance. 
 
There is extensive literature on the impact of capital structure on firm performance. The 
empirical findings of these studies in the extant literature that have used datasets and samples of 
firms from developed and developing economies have documented mixed  and inconclusive 
findings. For the purpose of this paper, we focus on the relevant and important ones after the  
M&M empirical studies that test the agency cost theory of capital structure. We also reviewed 
studies that found empirical supports for other theories of capital structure particularly studies 
that employed datasets and samples of firms from developing economies. 
 
Berger and Bonaccosi di Patti (2006) examined the relevance of the agency cost theory in the 
United States banking Industry revealed that higher leverage or a lower equity capital ratio is 
associated with higher profit efficiency over almost the entire range of the observed data of the 
study. Further evidence on the impact of capital structure on firm performance by Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007) departed largely from past studies that have investigated the relationship between 
capital structure and firm performance including the novel study of Berger and Bonacorssi di 
Patti (2006). The study employed the non-parametric efficiency measure that capture the 
industry’s best practice production frontier using data envelopment method (DEA) and quantile 
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regression method to test the way capital structure affect performance across spectrums of firms 
and compared the findings with OLS. These findings support the agency cost hypothesis that 
higher leverage lead to enhance performance measured by efficiency. Another interesting and 
related study by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) provides better understanding and empirical 
evidence on how competing hypotheses may behave at different segments of the relevant data 
distribution and cautioning against the standard practice of drawing inferences by capital 
structure studies that have used conditional mean (OLS) estimates.  The study found support for 
the prediction of the Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency cost hypothesis. Higher leverage was 
found to lead to improved performance in terms of efficiency over the entire range of the dataset.   
 
Contrary to Berger and Bonaccosi di Patti (2006) that used profit efficiency and Margaritis and 
Psillaki (2007&2010) that measure efficiency using X efficiency as proxy of firm performance, 
Yeh (2011) employed the dual of X-efficiency to measure performance of Banks in Taiwan in 
the study of capital structure and firm performance of Taiwanese firms. The stochastic frontier 
approach was used to determine cost efficiency as indicator of firm performance. The study 
argued that this method is superior to the data envelopment method employed by previous 
studies to estimate profit efficiency because it considers producer-specific random shocks to 
generate a relatively stable efficiency index for each firm. The study supports the agency cost 
theory of capital structure as the submissions of other similar studies that have used efficiency as 
measure of performance rather than financial performance (Berger and Borcossi di Patti, 2006; 
Margaritis and Psillaki, 2007, 2010). The findings of the study indicated that reducing 
managerial shareholdings will decrease agency costs and increase firm performance. To account 
for the impact of ownership on firm performance and how it interacts with capital structure. King 
and Santor (2008) examine the relationship between ownership structure, performance and 
capital structure. The estimated results indicated that leverage is negatively related to 
performance of Canadian firms. Contrarily, positive relationship was reported between leverage 
and firm performance by Kim (2005) for Japanese large business groups. 
 
Other studies in the extant literature carried out from the perspective of developing economies 
equally reported mixed findings. One of the notable studies was by Abor(2005). The study 
examines the relationship between capital structure and profitability of listed firms in Ghana 
from 1998 to 2002. The findings of this study indicates that significant positive relationship exist 
between short term debt ratio and return on equity. Similar positive result was reported between 
total debt to total capital and return on equity. The findings of this study support the tradeoff 
theory. However, the findings equally indicates that negative relationship exist between long 
term debt to total capital and the return on equity which supports the pecking order theory of 
capital structure. Further study by Abor (2007) enriched the capital structure literature by 
providing empirical evidence on the impact of debt policy on performance of small and medium 
enterprises in both Ghana and South Africa. This study focused on SMES, unlike past studies 
that have focused largely on large firms. The findings revealed that SMES in South Africa use 
more long term debt than Ghanaian SMES. The same applies to total debt as the results show 
that SMES in South Africa have more total debt in their capital structure than the Ghanaian 
SMES. The regression result shows that short term debt have significant negative effect on 
performance when gross profit margin was used as the proxy for performance for both Ghanaian 
and South African firms. The results also indicate that long term debt was significant and 
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positively related with gross profit margin for SMES in both countries. But the effect of total 
debt on gross profit margin was found to be significant and negatively related to gross profit 
margin.  
 
Zeitun and Tian (2007) reported similar significant negative result between capital structure and 
performance of Jordanian firms when accounting and markets measures were used as proxies of 
performance. This finding supports the position of Abor (2007) for Ghana and South Africa. 
However, they reported statistically significant positive relationship between capital structure 
and performance when capital structure was measured by short-term debt to total assets and the 
market measure (Tobin’s Q) was used to proxy performance. Similarly, Bandyopadyay (2005) 
reports positive relationship between leverage and sales performance of India firms. However, 
the study by Onaolapo and Kajola (2010) revealed significant negative relationship between   
performance and debt ratio which they contended supported the agency cost theory of capital 
structure.   
 
A related study by Ebaid (2009) examines the empirical relationship between debt level and 
financial performance of 64 listed non-financial Egyptian firms. The study show that negative 
significant relationship exists between short term debt, total debt and financial performance 
measured by Return on asset but the relationship between financial leverage and ROA was not 
found to be significant when long-term debt was used as measure of financial leverage. The 
study also reported that short-term debt, long-term debt and total debt were found not to have 
significant influence on financial performance when it was measured by ROE and Gross Margin. 
Generally, they assert that the results show that the capital structure choice has a weak-to-no 
impact on firm’s performance in Egypt.    
 
Further study on capital structure and firm performance by Majumdar and Sen (2010) examines 
the role of different types of debt on the strategic behaviour and performance of firms in India. 
The finding indicates that only fixed deposit has significant and positive relationship with 
performance. Other types of debt were not found to be significant. In a related study, San and 
Heng (2011) investigated the relationship between capital structure and performance of 
Malaysian firms in the construction sector before and during crisis that started since 2007.The 
results indicated that return on capital was found to be positively related to debt to equity market 
value for big firms. The same positive relationship was found between earnings per share and 
long term debt to capital. However, earnings per share were found to be negatively related with 
debt to capital. They also reported that operating margin and long term debt to common equity 
were positively related for medium companies and earnings per share and debt to capital has 
negative relationship in small companies.  
 
A study on Malaysian listed firms by Salim and Yadav (2012) analyze the effect of capital 
structure on performance of listed firms. The results indicated that capital structure measured by 
total debt and short term debts have negative impacts on ROE. This result is consistent with 
Ebaid (2009). Long term debt and Total debt as measure of capital structure has negative impact 
on the performance of firms when it was measured by ROA. This supports the findings of Zeitun 
and Tian (2007) and Abor (2007) that indicate that performance is negatively related to capital 
structure. The study also found that Tobin’s Q has positive and significant impact on short term 
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debt, long- term debt and total debt. A recent study by Fosu (2013) analyzes the effect of capital 
structure on firm performance with focus on the degree of product market competition of South 
African firms. The findings reveal that financial leverage has a positive and significant effect on 
firm performance and product market competition helps in enhancing the performance effect of 
leverage of South African firms. More recent studies by Oino and Ukaegbu (2015) on Nigeria 
firms indicated that profitability is negatively related to leverage. However, a current study by 
Bandyopadhyay and Barua (2016) on capital structure and firm performance in India indicated 
that macroeconomic cycle significantly influence capital structure choice of firms which in turn 
affect their performance. 
 
Generally, the empirical evidences on capital structure and firm performance are mixed and 
inconclusive. The measures of capital structure and firm performance differ across various 
studies. The estimation techniques also vary from one study to the other. The empirical 
irregularities necessitated further investigation into the impact of capital structure on firm 
performance particularly in the emerging market context (Nigeria) using agency cost theoretical 
model by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This is carried out with the focus of establishing the 
portability of the agency cost theoretical model of capital structure in an environment that has 
different institutional and structural characteristics from the developed markets where the model 
was developed based on experiences of firms operating in the developed western markets. It is 
against the foregoing that this study provides empirical investigation of the impact of capital 
structure on firm performance using the agency cost theoretical framework. The only hypothesis 
for this study is that:   
 
H1: there is a relationship between capital structure and firm performance. 
 
3.0 Data and Methodology 
The scope of the study cover 1998-2015 for one hundred and fifteen (115) companies listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange. The choice of the scope was due to data availability and to 
enhance validity. Financial services and investment firms were excluded in keeping with the 
style in previous studies and because these companies have different reporting requirements and 
are more heavily regulated.  In effect, this study employs secondary data available in the annual 
reports of listed companies in Nigeria and the facts books published by the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE). 
 
The empirical model below reflects the expectation of the agency cost theoretical model; this 
study specified the relationship between capital structure and firm performance following the 
work of Margaritis and Psillaki (2010). The study used dynamic panel model that recognizes the 
persistence of the dependent variable by including its lag value as an explanatory variable in the 
regression model. Using a dynamic panel model is particularly useful in that it removes the 
concern over econometric issues such as endogeneity and unobservable heterogeneity.   
 
In the model below roe is return on equity which is a measure of firm performance, and roeit-1 
represents performance in the previous period.  LEV is the measure of capital structure (short 
term leverage ratio, long term leverage ratio and total leverage ratio) and Zit is a vector of control 
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variables (firm size, age, ownership, growth opportunities, asset tangibility) Uit is a stochastic 
error term.  
 
)1......(........................................'10 ititititit uzlevroeroe     
 
In this model,  captures the speed of adjustment of performance to equilibrium. A value of 
 between 0 and 1 indicates the persistence of performance. One of the reasons why the standard 
ordinary least squares (OLS) is not suitable in this instance is the presence of the lagged 
dependent variable as part of the explanatory variables. This implies that the errors will become 
correlated violating one of the assumptions of OLS making the estimates of the parameters bias 
and inconsistent (Flannery and Hankins, 2013). A popular solution to this problem was proposed 
by Arellano and Bond (1991) who suggested the used of generalized methods of moment for 
dynamic panels. Their suggestion implies that the use of lagged exogenous variables at level is 
adequate instruments for the first difference lagged dependent variable. Blundell and Bond 
(1998) improved on this, arguing that lagged variables are inadequate in a context of limited time 
and large cross section.  They proposed a system of estimators which explore more moment 
conditions on the lagged difference and levels using lagged first difference of all the exogenous 
variables as instruments in the level equation.  
 
Two conditions are crucial in the reliability of a GMM model. One is the assumption of no 
autocorrelation and two is the validity of the instruments. Note that although residuals may have 
first order correlations, the presence of second order autocorrelation lead to inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters. The use of the lagged value of the explanatory variables improves 
the validity of the instruments.  
 
Table 1: Variable definition  
Variable  Description  Expected 
relationship  
Total leverage ratio (TLR) Defined as the total debt divided by total debt and total 
equity  
Positive 
Long term leverage (LTLR) Defined as long term debt divided by total debt plus total 
equity 
Positive 
Short term leverage (STLR) Short term debt divided by total debt plus equity. Positive 
Return on equity Defined as earnings before interest and tax divided by 
book value of equity 
Positive 
Size (SIZE) Defined as the natural log of total assets Positive 
Asset Tangibility (TANG) Defined as total tangible asset divided by total assets.  Positive 
Growth opportunity (GO) Defined as the percentage change in the log of total 
assets 
Positive/Negative 
Risk (RISK) Defined as the standard deviation of the earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets 
Positive/Negative 
Ownership Is the shareholding held by the  different categories of 
shareholders (Individual, foreign and institutions) 
Positive 
Age Defined the listing age of the firms on the exchange Positive 
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4.0 Estimations and Analyses 
The results of the estimated model and findings are discussed in the context of outcomes from 
previous studies and the predictions of the agency cost theoretical model of capital structure. We 
begin with providing the statistical properties of the variables included in our model. Table 1 
above defines the variables and their expected signs. Table 2 below presents the descriptive 
statistics.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std Dev. Min. Max. C.V Obs. 
Total leverage ratio 0.4092 1.0423 3.308 30.8928 2.54 1710 
Long term leverage ratio 0.1731 0.8839 0 21.017 5.10 1710 
Short term leverage ratio 0.7053 9.1541 0 216.6249 12.9 1710 
Age 30.6740 19.1659 0 89 0.62 1710 
Growth Opportunities 0.1555 2.1229 28.7904 33.16512 13.65 1710 
Asset Tangibility 0.1927 0.3623 0 10.44 1.88 1710 
Size 7.6004 5.4619 4.2929 20.0598 0.71 1710 
Return on equity 6.8590 58.489 7.99 1558.6 8.52 1710 
Ownership 18.8021 16.526 0 33.666 0.87 1710 
 
TLR is Total leverage ratio defined as the total debt divided by total debt and total equity. LTLR is Long term leverage defined as long term debt 
divided by total debt plus total equity. STLR is short term leverage defined as short term debt divided by total debt plus equity. SIZE is firm size 
defined as the natural log of total assets.  TANG is asset tangibility defined as total tangible asset divided by total assets.  GO is growth 
opportunity defined as the percentage change in the log of total assets. RISK is risk, defined as the standard deviation of the earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets. Ownership is the shareholding held by the   different categories of shareholders (Individual, foreign and 
institutions). Age is the listing age of the firms on the exchange.  CV=Coefficient of Variation; Std. Dev. = Standard Deviation. 
 
The table shows the number of observations, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation for all variables from 1998 to 2012. During the entire period, the mean of 
total leverage ratio is 0.40 for the entire sample firms. This is greater than the mean of long term 
leverage ratio of 0.17 but less than the mean of short term leverage of 0.70. This indicates that on 
the average the sample firms employ more short-term debt than long term debt as a proportion of 
total asset. The standard deviation and coefficient of variation for the total leverage ratio of the 
sample firms is 1.04 and 2.54 respectively. This suggests that total leverage ratio of sample firms 
has high variability as evidence in the coefficient of variation (2.54) that is greater than one. 
Long term leverage ratio has standard deviation of 0.88 and coefficient of variation of 5.10. This 
indicates that long term leverage ratio has higher variability in terms of coefficient of variation 
than total leverage ratio. Short term leverage ratio has the highest standard deviation (9.15) and 
coefficient of variation (12.9) than total leverage and long term leverage ratios. The range of 
total leverage ratio is between 3.30 and 30.89 for the sample firms from 1998 to 2012. Long term 
leverage ratio of the sample firms ranges between 0 and 21.01 while the range of short term 
leverage ratio for the sample firms is between 0 and 216.62. 
 
The average age of sample firms is 30 years. The oldest firms have been in existence for 89 
years. The variability of the age of the sample firms is 0.62 as shown by the coefficient of 
variation. This indicates low variability. The standard deviation of age of the sample firms is 
19.16. The average growth opportunity of the sample firms is 0.15. The standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation of growth opportunities for the sample firms between 1998 and 2012 is 
2.12 and 13.65 respectively. This indicates high degree of variability of growth opportunities of 
the sample firms. The firm with the smallest growth opportunities has growth opportunities of 
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28.79 and firm with the largest growth opportunities has 33.16 has growth opportunities. The 
average fixed asset as a percentage of total assets (Asset tangibility) of the sample firms is 0.192. 
The standard deviation is 0.36 and coefficient of variation is 1.88. The minimum is 0 and 
maximum is 10.44. The average size of sample firms from 1998-2012 is 7.60. The minimum size 
is 4.2 and maximum size is 20.9. The standard deviation and coefficient of variation of the size 
of sample firm is 4.29 and 20.05 respectively. This indicates that firm size has higher variability. 
The average return on equity of sample firms is 6.85. The coefficient of variation is 8.52 and 
standard deviation is 58.48. This signifies that variability of return on equity is high as the 
coefficient of variation is greater than one. The range of return on equity for the sample firms is 
between 7.99 and 1558.6. The average shareholders of the firms have 18.80 shares as form of 
ownership stake. The standard deviation is 16.52 and coefficient of variation is 0.87. This 
indicates that the variability of ownership is low as the coefficient of variation is less than one. 
 
4.1 Results and Discussion of findings 
The results in Table 3 below show positive significant relationship between leverage measure by 
short term leverage ratio and firm performance (Return on equity). The estimated result produced 
coefficient of 0.61(P value of 0.000). The result indicates that short term leverage ratio is 
statistical significant at 1 percent significance level. The positive significant relationship between 
short term leverage ratio and firm performance (ROE) may indicate that capital structure (short 
term leverage ratio) has been effectively use as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash 
flow waste and mitigate the opportunistic behaviours of shareholders-managers through short 
term debt repayment obligations (Grossman and Hart,1982).  
 
The result suggests that shareholders-managers have been able to use short term debt to enhance 
the performance of firms in a way that equity investments of outside equity investors are 
protected and enhanced. This is possible in a setting like Nigeria where majority of firms depend 
on short term financing from commercial banks to finance their operations due to 
underdeveloped bond market and high cost of raising equity from the stock market. The result 
supports the theoretical prediction of the agency cost theoretical model by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) that high debts ratios serve as a disciplinary device which may help reduce the waste of 
cash flow due to the debt repayment obligation which makes managers strive to ensure they 
generate sufficient cash flow that can prevent liquidation. 
 
To examine the agency cost theoretical prediction that conflict of interests exist between debt 
holders and equity investors (Myers, 1977), we include the square term of short term leverage 
ratio in the model. The result shows a negative significant relationship between the square term 
of leverage ratio and return on equity. This finding conforms with the negative theoretical 
prediction of the agency cost model that debt financing may aggravate the underinvestment 
problem (Stulz, 1990). The result indicates that short term debt may be excessively employed by 
firms in a bid to use debt as a disciplinary device to reduce managerial cash flows. The excess 
short term debt may be employed for suboptimal investment which increases the default risk 
which may make debt repayment very difficult and eventually can result to debt overhang 
problem which may be inimical to firm performance. In this kind of case, debt may not produce 
the desirable beneficial better performance that outside equity participants expect from the use of 
debt through the reduction of agency problem to ensure better performance. The negative 
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significant results between the square of short term leverage ratio and return on equity reflect the 
true state of how firm debt financing affect shareholder’s investment of firms in Nigeria.   
 
Table 3: Two-step Dynamic GMM Estimations  
Variables STLR LTLR TLR 
 
ROEt-1 0.4238 (0.000)*** 0.4225 (0.000)*** 0.4396 (0.000)*** 
STLR/LTLR/TLR 0.6157 (0.000)*** 1.2585 (0.175) 8.5413 (0.000)*** 
STLR)2/(LTLR)2/(TLR)2  -0.0030 (0.000)*** -0.0509 (0.253) -0.2781 (0.000)*** 
Asset Tangibility -1.0153 (0.165) -0.0247 (0.974) -0.8307 (0.000)*** 
Size -0.0739 (0.021) -0.0653 (0.038) -0.1856 (0.000)*** 
Age -0.0566 (0.001) -0.0292 (0.057) -0.05136 (0.000)*** 
Growth opportunities -0.0022 (0.875) -0.0063 (0.563) -0.0067 (0.490) 
 Risk 0.0006 (0.575) 0.0001 (0.895) -0.0031 (0.000) 
Ownership -0.0617 (0.008) -0.0142 (0.414) -0.0842 (0.000) 
Arellano and Bond AR(2) 0.310 0.305 0.329 
Hansen Prob 1.600 1.678 1.538 
 
TLR is Total leverage ratio defined as the total debt divided by total debt and total equity. LTLR is Long term leverage defined as long term debt 
divided by total debt plus total equity. STLR is short term leverage defined as short term debt divided by total debt plus equity.. SIZE is firm size 
defined as the natural log of total assets.  TANG is asset tangibility defined as total tangible asset divided by total assets.  GO is growth 
opportunity defined as the percentage change in the log of total assets. RISK is risk, defined as the standard deviation of the earnings before 
interest and tax divided by total assets. Ownership is the shareholding held by the   different categories of shareholders (Individual, foreign and 
institutions). Age is the listing age of the firms on the exchange.  Note: Significance level *10% **5% ***1%. P values are in parentheses. 
 
Apart from the use of unconventional measure of capital structure (short term leverage ratio) in 
model 1 as a result of the fact that majority of non-financial firms in the study setting (Nigeria) 
use more short term debt than long term debt (see table 2 on descriptive statistics), the study 
equally include the conventional and common measure of capital structure (long term leverage 
ratio and total leverage ratio) employ in most of the capital structure literature (see, Psillaki and 
Margaritis,2010;Fosu, 2013). The study therefore employs long term leverage ratio in model; 1 
as measure of capital structure to analyse the impact of capital structure on firm performance in 
order to test the portability of the theoretical predictions of the agency cost model by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) in the Nigerian context.  
 
The estimated result for the long-term leverage ratio indicates positive insignificant relationship 
between capital structure (long term leverage ratio) and firm performance (ROE). The estimated 
results produced coefficient of 1.2585(P value of 0.175).The results indicates that total leverage 
ratio is not statistical significant at any of the conventional levels. The result suggests that long 
term debt may not be sufficiently available to use as a disciplinary device to reduce cash flow 
waste of shareholder-managers (Grossman and Hart, 1982; Garcia Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 
2010; Lidia Diaz-Diaz, Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2016) such that firm performance 
can be enhanced. Based on the positive insignificant results that exist between capital structure 
(long-term leverage ratio) and firm performance (ROE) The study advanced further for the 
purpose of robustness employed another traditional conventional measure of leverage (total 
leverage ratio) to assess the impact of capital structure on firm performance.  The estimated 
result above indicate positive significant relationship between capital structure (total leverage 
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ratio) and firm performance (ROE).The estimated result produced coefficient of 8.5413(P value 
of 0.000).The result indicates that total leverage ratio is statistical significant at any of the 
conventional levels.  
 
The implication of the positive significant relationship found between capital structure (total 
leverage ratio) and firm performance (ROE) is that leverage may have helped to reduce the 
agency problems at the firm level thereby assist in ensuring managers strive to achieve better 
performance(ROE) through optimal use of debts to create value for shareholders. This results 
support the theoretical position of the agency cost theoretical hypothesis that high debt ratios 
may use be able to prevent the opportunistic behaviour of shareholders-managers and ensure the 
protection of interest of outside equity investors. Debt may serve as disciplinary device that 
ensure shareholders-managers generate cash flows and do not waste the cash flows. This is 
possible because of the repayment obligations associated with debt.  
 
The positive findings between leverage and firm performance conforms to the findings in the 
study of Margaritis and Psillaki (2007) that reported positive relationship between leverage and 
firm performance of New Zealand companies.The finding is also in line with similar positive 
finding in the study carried out by Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) using sample of French firms 
where they reported positive relationship between leverage and performance thereby supports the 
agency cost hypothesis that higher leverage is related to improved performance. The positive 
relationship between leverage and performance reveal in this study equally supports the positive 
findings in the works of San and Heng (2011) for Malaysian firms and Majumdar and Sen (2010) 
for Indian firms. Similar positive finding between leverage and firm performance was reported in 
the study of Abor (2005) that document positive relationship between leverage and performance 
of firms in Ghana. The findings of these studies suggests that disciplinary measures embodied in 
debt contracts can be used to mitigate agency problem which in turn reduce moral hazards of the 
managers thereby make them strive to achieve better firm performance.  
 
However, the negative relationship between square of leverage (short term, long term and total 
leverage) and firm performance (ROE) conforms to the theoretical prediction of the agency cost 
theory by Jensen and Meckling (1976) that at excessive use of debt leverage tends to impinge 
firm performance. The negative finding reported between leverage and firm performance 
conforms with empirical finding in studies such as Armen et al., (2004), Zeitun and Tian (2007), 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) King and Santor (2008), Ghosh (2008); Ebaid (2009), Asimakopoulos 
et al.,(2009), Liew (2010), Majumdar and Sen (2010),Salim and Yadav (2012) on the 
relationship between leverage and firm performance. The work of Ebaid (2009) on Egyptian firm 
shows negative relationship between leverage and firm performance. Similar negative result was 
documented in the study of Salam and Yadav (2012) that reported negative relationship between 
leverage and firm performance of listed firms in Malaysia. Similar negative result was 
documented in the work of Zeitun and Tian (2007) on Jordanian listed firms. The negative 
finding between leverage and firm performance supports the under investment or debt overhang 
problem of firms that arises due to default risk that may occur due to conflict of interest between 
debt holders and shareholders as posits by Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
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Generally, the empirical findings from the estimated model using short term, long term and total 
leverage ratios and their square term as main variables in model 1 indicate that the relationship 
between capital structure and firm performance in Nigeria is mixed. The findings generally 
provide support for the agency cost theoretical model of capital structure as posits by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and espoused by Stulz (1990).Stulz (1990) relate that debt can have both 
positive and negative effect on firm performance and both effects are presumed to be present in 
all firms. This study therefore supports the portability of the agency cost theoretical model in the 
Nigerian context but not full portability due to several market imperfections of the Nigerian 
environment (High default risk, high transaction costs, information asymmetries, risk shifting 
behaviour, poor contract enforcement and weak investor protection, weak legal institutions, 
unsound corporate governance etc) that characterize a lower income developing market like 
Nigeria which may restrict the full portability of the agency cost theory in the Nigerian context. 
 
5.0 Conclusion  
Agency cost theorists have argued that capital structure can have both positive and negative 
impact on firm performance. This depends on how debt is use to resolve conflict of interest 
between shareholders and managers on one hand and between debt holders and shareholders on 
the other hand. The study found evidence that show capital structure (Short term leverage and 
total leverage ratios) are directly related to firm performance(return on equity).The implication 
being that the more short term employed by firms in Nigeria the better the returns to 
shareholders. The use of debt may push majority shareholders to exert more control and 
monitoring to ensure those they have appointed to manage the firm on day to day strive to 
achieve better performance to meet up with debt repayment obligations and employ debt to 
finance positive net present value projects such that they can obtain better returns on their equity. 
The practical implication of this in reducing agency problems in a setting where the majority 
shareholders dominates the minority shareholders is that greater use of both short term and long 
term debt may mean better protection of financial interest of minority shareholders in Nigeria 
firms. The results still confirm the relevance of the agency cost theoretical model to explain 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance in the Nigerian context. It is against 
this backdrop that this study concludes that capital structure matters for firm performance. 
 
The regulators need to create fair rules and regulations that can empower and protect 
shareholders of companies especially the minority shareholders who often times have minute 
diluted shares in firms and do not have the capacity and resources to monitor as well as sue the 
majority shareholders who engage in opportunistic activities that are detrimental to the interest of 
the minority shareholders. In view of this, there is need for urgent regulations and enforcements 
that can protect and give better protections to the minority shareholders so that their interest can 
be more protected. 
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